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Abstract. The process algebras TiMo (Timed Mobility) and its extension PerTiMo (Permissions, Timers
and Mobility) were recently proposed to support engineering applications in distributed system design. TiMo
provides a formal framework in which process migration between distinct locations and timing constraints
linked to local clocks can be modelled and analysed. This is extended in PerTiMo by associating access
permissions to communication to model security aspects of a distributed system. In this paper we develop
a new semantic model for TiMo using Rewriting Logic (RL) and strategies, with the aim of providing a
foundation for tool support; in particular, strategies are used to capture the locally maximal concurrent step
of a TiMo specification which previously required the use of action rules based on negative premises. This
RL model is then extended with access permissions in order to develop a new semantic model for PerTiMo.
These RL semantical models are formally proved to be sound and complete with respect to the original
operational semantics on which they were based. We present examples of how the developed RL models for
TiMo and PerTiMo can be implemented within the strategy-based rewriting system Elan and illustrate
the range of (behavioural) properties that can be analysed using such a tool.
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1. Introduction
The process algebras TiMo (Timed Mobility) [CiK08] and its extension PerTiMo (Permissions, Timers
and Mobility) [CiK11b, CiK14] were recently proposed to support engineering applications in distributed
system design. In TiMo processes can migrate between distinct locations and timers linked to local clocks
are used to control mobility and communication actions. The resulting semantic approach based on local
maximal concurrency is motivated by the assumptions made by the GALS approach [Das06], which specifies
that systems operate under a `globally asynchronous/locally synchronous' execution strategy. The behaviour
of TiMo specifications can be captured using a set of SOS rules or suitable Petri nets [CiK11a], both based
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on executing time actions with negative premises (i.e. premises which ensure that no other alternative actions
are applicable). PerTiMo is an extension of TiMo which associates access permissions with communication
actions in order to model security aspects of a distributed system [CiK11b, CiK14]. Moreover, processes are
able to acquire new access permissions, or lose some of their current access permissions while moving between
locations, modelling an important security feature.
In this paper, we present new semantic models for TiMo and PerTiMo with the aim of providing a
basis for much needed tool support and a formal framework for investigating the different semantic options
available. We use Rewriting Logic (RL) [Mes92], an algebraic formalism for modelling dynamic systems which
uses equational specifications to define the states of a system, and rewrite rules to capture the dynamic state
transitions. Strategies [BKKR01, BKKM02] are an integral part of RL and provide control over the rewriting
process, allowing important dynamic properties to be modelled.
We develop an RL model for TiMo which involves formulating a strategy that captures the maximal
parallel computational step of a TiMo specification, including its time rule based on negative premises.
The resulting RL model is formally validated by showing that it is both sound and complete with respect
to the original operational semantics of TiMo. To illustrate using the RL semantics as a basis for tool
support we use the strategy-based rewrite system Elan [BKKMR98, BKKM02] to simulate and analyse
TiMo specifications. The simple example we provide gives a useful insight into the proposed RL modelling
approach and illustrates the type of (behavioural) properties that can be analysed. This work extends the
initial research on modelling TiMo presented in [CKS12].
In order to specify and reason about access permissions for mobility and communication in a distributed
environment the TiMo framework has been extended with access permissions. PerTiMo [CiK11b, CiK14] is
a formal framework for specifying interprocess communication controlled by access permissions that processes
must possess in order to send and receive information. Access permissions are dynamic, and processes acquire
and lose access permissions when migrating between locations. We consider how to modify our RL model for
TiMo to develop a new semantic model for PerTiMo. This provides a basis for tool support for PerTiMo
and also illustrates the flexibility and extendibility provided by using the RL framework. The resulting RL
model is prototyped again using Elan and formally validated against the original PerTiMo semantics.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the syntax and semantics of TiMo and introduces
a small illustrative example. Section 3 briefly introduces RL and the idea of rewriting strategies. In Section 4,
we develop an RL model of TiMo and provide a formal argument for its correctness. A simple example of
the RL model is then implemented using the support tool Elan and the type of properties that can be
analysed using our approach are illustrated. In Section 5 we introduce PerTiMo and extend our RL model
with access permissions to provide a new semantic model for PerTiMo. The resulting RL model is formally
shown to be correct and Elan is again used to implement a small illustrative example. Finally, in Section 6
we conclude by discussing related work and by considering areas for future work.
2. TiMo (Timed Mobility Language)
TiMo (Timed Mobility) [CiK08, CiK11a, CiK11b, CiK14] is a process algebra for mobile systems where it
is possible to add timers to the basic actions, and each location runs according to its own local clock which
is invisible to processes. Processes have communication capabilities which are active up to a predefined time
deadline. Other timing constraints specify the latest time for moving between locations.
We assume suitable data types together with associated operations, including a set Loc of locations, a
set Chan of communication channels, and a set Id of process identifiers, where each id ∈ Id has arity mid .
We use ~x to denote a finite tuple of elements (x1, . . . , xk) whenever it does not lead to a confusion.
The syntax of TiMo is given in Table 1, where P represents processes and N represents networks.
Moreover, for each id ∈ Id , there is a unique process definition (Def), where the ui's are distinct variables
playing the role of parameters; the X idi 's are data types, and Pid is a process expression which may make
use of the variables ui. In Table 1, it is assumed that: (i) a ∈ Chan is a channel, and t ∈ N∪{∞} represents
a timeout; (ii) each vi is an expression built from data values and variables; (iii) each ui is a variable, and
each Xi is a data type; (iv) l is a location or a location variable; and (v) s is a special symbol used to state
that a process is temporarily `stalled'.
The only variable binding construct is a∆t ? (~u: ~X) then P else P ′ which binds the variables ~u within P
(but not within P ′). We use fv(P ) to denote the free variables of a process P (and similarly for networks).
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Processes P ::= a∆t ! 〈~v〉 then P else P ′ p (output)
a∆t ? (~u: ~X) then P else P ′ p (input)
go∆t l then P p (move)
P |P ′ p (parallel)
id(~v) p (recursion)
stop p (termination)
sP (stalling)
Networks N ::= l [[P ]] p N |N ′
Definition id(u1, . . . , umid : X
id
1 , . . . , X
id
mid
)
df
= Pid (Def)
Table 1. TiMo Syntax. Length of ~u is the same as ~X, and length of ~v in id(~v) is mid .
Init Web
Done
Err
- 

1
PPPPPq
Fig. 1. A pictorial representation of a simple TiMo work flow example.
For a process definition as in (Def), we assume that fv(Pid) ⊆ {u1, . . . , umid}, and so the free variables of Pid
are parameter bound. Processes are defined up to the alpha-conversion, and {v/u, . . .}P is obtained from P
by replacing all free occurrences of a variable u by v, etc, possibly after alpha-converting P in order to avoid
clashes. Moreover, if ~v and ~u are tuples of the same length then {~v/~u}P denotes {v1/u1, v2/u2, . . . , vk/uk}P .
A process a∆t ! 〈~v〉 then P else P ′ attempts to send a tuple of values ~v over the channel a for t time
units. If successful, it continues as process P ; otherwise it continues as the alternative process P ′. A process
a∆t ? (~u: ~X) then P else P ′ attempts for t time units to input a tuple of values of type ~X and substitute
them for the variables ~u. Mobility is implemented by a process go∆t l then P which moves from the
current location to the location l within t time units. Note that since l can be a variable, and so its value
is assigned dynamically through communication with other processes, migration actions support a flexible
scheme for moving processes around a network. Processes are further constructed from the (terminated)
process stop and parallel composition P |P ′. Finally, process expressions of the form sP are a purely
technical device which is used in the subsequent formalisation of structural operational semantics of TiMo;
intuitively, s specifies that a process P is temporarily (i.e., until a clock tick) stalled and so cannot execute
any action. A located process l[[P ]] is a process running at location l, and a network is composed out of its
components N |N ′.
As an illustrative example, consider a simple workflow example in which a processing job moves from
an initial location to a web service location and finally to a done location. If an error occurs with the web
service then the job enters an error location. A pictorial representation of this example is given in Figure
1. The TiMo specification WF consists of four locations: Init ; Web; Done; and Err . The following process
identifier definitions are used:
job
df
= a∆1 ? (l :Loc) then go∆1 l then job else job
serv(l :Loc)
df
= a∆2 ! 〈l〉 then serv(l) else serv(l)
servErr(l :Loc)
df
= a∆2 ! 〈l〉 then servErr(l) else servErr(Err)
For instance, Init [[ job | serv(Web) ]] | Web [[ serv(Done) ]] could be an initial TiMo network for this example.
A network N is well-formed if: (i) there are no free variables in N ; (ii) there are no occurrences of
the special symbol s in N ; (iii) assuming that id is as in the recursive equation (Def), for every id(~v)
occurring in N or on the right hand side of any recursive equation, the expression vi is of type corresponding
to X idi . We let Prs(TM ) and Net(TM ) represent the set of well-formed TiMo process and network terms
respectively. The first component of the operational semantics of TiMo is the structural equivalence ≡ on
networks. It is the smallest congruence such that the equalities (Eq1Eq3) in Table 2 hold. Using (Eq1
Eq3) one can always transform a given network N into a finite parallel composition of networks of the form
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(Eq1) N |N ′ ≡ N ′ |N
(Eq2) (N |N ′) |N ′′ ≡ N | (N ′ |N ′′)
(Eq3) l [[P |P ′ ]] ≡ l [[P ]] | l [[P ′ ]]
(Call) l [[ id(~v) ]]
id@l−→ l [[s {~v/~u}Pid ]]
(Move) l [[ go∆t l′ then P ]] l
′@l−→ l′ [[sP ]]
(Com)
v1 ∈ X1 . . . vk ∈ Xk
l [[ a∆t ! 〈~v〉 then P else Q | a∆t′ ? (~u: ~X) then P ′ else Q′ ]]
a〈~v〉@l
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ l [[sP | s {~v/~u}P ′ ]]
(Par)
N
ψ−→ N ′
N |N ′′ ψ−→ N ′ |N ′′
(Equiv)
N ≡ N ′ N ′ ψ−→ N ′′ N ′′ ≡ N ′′′
N
ψ−→ N ′′′
(Time)
N 6−→l
N
√
l−→ φl(N)
Table 2. Three rules of the structural equivalence (Eq1-Eq3), and six action rules (Call Move Com Par Equiv Time) of
the operational semantics. In (Par) and (Equiv) ψ is an action, and in (Time) l is a location.
l1 [[P1 ]] | . . . | ln [[Pn ]] such that no process Pi has the parallel composition operator at its topmost level.
Each subnetwork li [[Pi ]] is called a component of N , the set of all components is denoted by comp(N), and
the parallel composition is called a component decomposition of the network N . Note that these notions
are well defined since component decomposition is unique up to the permutation of the components. This
follows from the rule (Call) which treats recursive definitions as function calls which take a unit of time.
Another consequence of such a treatment is that it is impossible to execute an infinite sequence of action
steps without executing any local clock ticks.
Table 2 introduces two kinds of operational semantics rules: N
ψ−→ N ′ and N
√
l−→ N ′. The former is an
execution of an action ψ by some process, and the latter a unit time progression at location l. In the rule
(Time), N 6→l means that the rules (Call) and (Com) as well as (Move) with ∆t = ∆0 cannot be applied
to N for this particular location l. Moreover, φl(N) is obtained by taking the component decomposition of
N and simultaneously replacing all the components of the form l [[ go∆t l′ then P ]] by l [[ go∆t−1 l′ then P ]],
and all components of the form l [[ a∆tω then P else Q ]] (where ω stands for ! 〈~v〉 or ? (~u: ~X)) by l [[Q ]] if
t = 0, and l [[ a∆t−1ω then P else Q ]] otherwise. After that, all the occurrences of the symbol s in N are
erased.
The above defines executions of individual actions. A complete computational step is captured by a
derivation of the form N
Ψ
=⇒ N ′, where Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψm} (m ≥ 0) is a finite multiset of l-actions for some
location l (i.e., actions of the form id@l or l′@l or a〈~v〉@l) such that N ψ1−→ N1 · · ·Nm−1 ψm−→ Nm
√
l−→ N ′.
That is, a derivation is a condensed representation of a sequence of individual actions followed by a clock
tick, all happening at the same location. In other words, for any multiset of actions Ψ, any permutation of the
individual actions in Ψ corresponds to the same derivation (see Proposition 2 in [CiK11a]). Thus a derivation
captures the cumulative effect of the concurrent (i.e. interleaved) execution of the multiset of actions Ψ at
location l. It is important to note that the semantical treatment of TiMo goes beyond interleaving semantics
by introducing an explicit representation of maximal concurrency in the execution of actions. We say that
N ′ is directly reachable from N . Whenever there is only a time progression at a location, we have N ∅=⇒ N ′.
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As an example, consider three derivation steps in the workflow network:
Init [[ job | serv(Web) ]] | Web [[ serv(Done) ]]
{job@Init,serv@Init}
==============⇒
Init [[ a∆1 ? (l :Loc) then go∆1 l then job else job | a∆2 ! 〈Web〉 then
serv(Web) else serv(Web) ]] | Web [[ serv(Done) ]]
{a〈Web〉@Init}
==========⇒
Init [[ go∆1 Web then job | serv(Web) ]] | Web [[ serv(Done) ]]
{Web@Init,serv@Init}
===============⇒
Init [[ a∆2 ! 〈Web〉 then serv(Web) else serv(Web) ]] | Web [[ job | serv(Done) ]]
One can show that derivations are well defined as one cannot execute an unbounded sequence of action
moves without time progressing, and the execution Ψ is made up of independent (or concurrent) individual
executions (see explanation above). Moreover, derivations preserve well-formedness of networks (see [CiK08]).
3. Rewriting Logic and Strategies
Rewriting logic (RL) [Mes92] is an algebraic specification approach which is able to model dynamic system
behaviour. In RL the static properties of a system are described by a standard algebraic specification (see
[EhM85, MeT92]), whereas the dynamic behaviour of the system is modelled using rewrite rules. Rewrite
strategies are then used to control the application of rewrite rules and allow an RL specification to capture
subtle aspects of a dynamic system. A brief introduction to RL and rewriting strategies is presented below
(for a more detailed introduction see [Mes92, BKKM02]).
An Ssorted signature Σ defines a collection of function symbols, where: c : s ∈ Σ means c is a constant
symbol of sort s ∈ S; and
f : s(1) . . . s(n)→ s ∈ Σ
means f is a function symbol in Σ of domain type s(1) . . . s(n), arity n, and codomain type s. Let X =
〈Xs | s ∈ S〉 be a family of sets of variables. We let T (Σ, X) = 〈T (Σ, X)s | s ∈ S〉 be the family of sets of
all terms over Σ and X. For any term t ∈ T (Σ, X)s, we let Var(t) ⊆ ∪s∈S Xs represent the set of variables
used in t. We let T (Σ, X)/E represent the free quotient algebra of terms with respect to a set of equations
E over Σ and X. For for any term t ∈ T (Σ, X)s, we let 〈t〉E represent the equivalence class of term t with
respect to the equations E (see [MeT92]).
In RL a specification (Σ, E) defines the states 〈t〉E of a system. The dynamic behaviour of the system is
then specified by rewrite rules [Mes92, BKKM02]:
l =⇒ r,
for terms l, r ∈ T (Σ, X)s and s ∈ S, where Var(r) ⊆ Var(l). Such rules represent dynamic transitions
between states 〈l〉E and 〈r〉E . We also allow rules to be labelled and to contain conditions:
[lb] l =⇒ r if c,
where lb is a (not necessarily unique) label, c ∈ T (Σ, X)bool and Var(c) ⊆ V ar(l). Intuitively, the condition
means that the rewrite rule can only be applied if term c rewrites to true. A Rewriting logic specification is
therefore a triple Spec = (Σ, E,R) consisting of an algebraic specification (Σ, E) and a set of (conditional)
rewrite rules R over Σ and X.
As an example of an RL specification consider a model of a simple dynamic system in which states
are multisets of symbols A, B, and C. The resulting RL specification Spec(MS ) = (Σ, E,R) is defined as
follows. Let S = {ent,ms} be a sort set and let Σ be an S-sorted signature which contains the following
function symbols:
A,B,C : ent ∈ Σ,
empty : ms ∈ Σ, ,
@ : ent→ ms ∈ Σ,
@⊗@ : ms ms→ ms ∈ Σ,
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(where @ is used to indicate the position of an argument in a function symbol to allow for an infix notation).
Note that the signature contains an implicit type coercion operator @ : ent→ ms.) The set of equations E
contains the equations which axiomatize the associative/commutative properties of a multiset. Note that
the rewrite rules defined below will be applied modulo these equations. Finally, we define R to contain the
following three rewrite rules:
[Rule1 ] A⊗m1 =⇒ B ⊗m1 [Rule2 ] B ⊗ C ⊗m1 =⇒ B ⊗A⊗m1
[Rule3 ] B ⊗ B ⊗m1 =⇒ C ⊗m1 .
where m1 ∈ Xms. Let A⊗ C be a multiset representing the initial state of the system. Then the trace
A⊗ C =⇒ B ⊗ C =⇒ B ⊗A =⇒ B ⊗B =⇒ C
represents one possible evolution of the system.
Rewriting Logic provides the notion of a strategy for controlling the application of rewrite rules [BKKR01,
BKKM02]. A strategy allows the user to specify the order in which rewrite rules are applied and the possible
choices that can be made. The result of applying a strategy is the set of all possible terms that can be
produced according to the strategy. A strategy is said to fail if it can not be applied (i.e. produces no
results). The following is a brief overview of some elementary strategies (based on [BKKR01, BKKM02]):
(i) Basic strategy: lb Any label used in a labelled rule [lb] t => t ′ is a strategy. The result of applying
a basic strategy lb is the set of all terms that could result from one application of any rule labelled lb.
(ii) Concatenation strategy: s1 ; s2 Allows strategies to be sequentially composed, i.e. s2 is applied to the
set of results from s1 .
(iii) Don't know strategy: dk(s1 , . . . , sn) Returns the union of all the sets of terms that result from applying
each strategy s1, . . . , sn. This strategy fails if, and only if, all the strategies s1 , . . . , sn fail.
(iv) Don't care strategy: dc(s1 , . . . , sn) Chooses nondeterministically to apply one of the strategies si
which does not fail. Again, the strategy can only fail if all of the strategies s1 , . . . , sn fail. The strat-
egy dc one(s1 , . . . , sn) works in a similar way but chooses a single result term to return, where as
first(s1 , . . . , sn) applies the first successful strategy in the sequence s1 , . . . , sn .
(v) Iterative strategies: repeat∗(s) Repeatedly applies s, zero or more times, until the s fails. It returns
the last set of results produced before s failed. The repeat+(s) version works in a similar way but insists
that s must be successfully applied at least once.
As an example, the strategy
repeat∗(dk(Rule1 ,Rule2 ,Rule3 )
for Spec(MS ) simply returns all terms reachable by repeatedly applying the three rules and so produces the
same set of terms as in the original example. Alternatively, repeat∗(first(Rule1 ,Rule2 ,Rule3 ) is a strategy
for Spec(MS ) which prioritises the rules so that Rule1 is always applied first if it can be, Rule2 is applied
only if the first rule cannot be applied and Rule3 is applied only if the previous two rules cannot be applied.
The above elementary strategy language can be extended to a defined strategy language [BKKR01,
BKKM02] which allows recursive strategies to be defined. As an example, consider the simple recursive
search strategy search(i) defined below:
doStep =⇒ dk(Rule1 ,Rule2 ,Rule3 )
search(i) =⇒ fail if i <= 0
search(i) =⇒ first(found , doStep; search(i − 1 )) if i > 0
The strategy search(i) repeatedly applies the strategy doStep looking for a multi-set term that satisfies the
strategy found . It fails if the given maximum number of iterations i is reached. So to search for a multi-set
term containing A⊗B ⊗ C we would define the strategy found by the following rewrite rule:
[found ] A⊗ B ⊗ C ⊗m1 =⇒ A⊗ B ⊗ C ⊗m1
A range of tools have been developed for supporting rewriting logic and strategies, including: Maude
[CDEL02]; Elan [BKKMR98, BKKM02]; Stratego [Vis01]; and Tom [BBKMR07]. In this paper we have
chosen to use Elan to implement our examples given its simple strategy language and the authors' experience
with this tool.
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4. Modelling TiMo using Rewriting Logic and Strategies
In this section we develop a semantic model of TiMo using rewriting logic and strategies, and provide a
formal argument of correctness.
4.1. Developing an RL Model for TiMo
Given a TiMo specification TM we consider how to develop a corresponding RL model RL(TM ) that
correctly captures the meaning of TM . We begin by modelling the general concept of a process and network
in RL.
Let S be the set of sorts in RL(TM ) containing: nat for time; Chan for channels; VLoc, ALoc, and Loc
for locations; Prs for processes. and Nets for networks. Coping with the parameter passing that occurs in
communication requires careful consideration and for this reason the sort Loc is defined as the union of two
subsorts: VLoc represents the input location variables; and ALoc represents the actual locations used in TM .
Note for simplicity, we have restricted the parameters used in communication between processes within TM
to a single location parameter. Extending this would be relatively straightforward and would involve adding
the appropriate sorts to the sort set S (as has been done for locations).
The S-sorted signature ΣRL(TM ) for RL(TM ) contains the following function symbols to capture the
syntax for processes given in Table 1:
stop : Prs, S (@) : Prs → Prs, @ | @ : Prs Prs → Prs
go(@,@) then @ : nat Loc Prs → Prs
in(@,@)(@) then @ else @ : Chan nat VLoc Prs Prs → Prs
out(@,@) < @ > then @ else @ : Chan nat Loc Prs Prs → Prs.
The function symbol @ | @ is defined equationally to be associative and commutative as per the definition
of TiMo. To model process definitions we add a function symbol id : s1 . . . sn → Prs for each process
identifier id(u1, . . . , un : s1, . . . , sn), where si is assumed to be a welldefined data type in our model. Note
that given we have restricted parameters to being locations only, each si has to be one of the built in sorts
nat , Chan or ALoc.
We then define the following function symbols to represent networks:
@[@] : ALoc Prs → Nets; @ | @ : Nets Nets → Nets;
where @ | @ is again defined to be associative and commutative.
We now need to formulate appropriate rewrite rules to begin to capture the intended semantics of TiMo.
In the RL model developed here we choose the approach of forcing network components with the same
location to merge (this turns out to be important since it simplifies the selection of a location to update).
The above approach is realized using the rule al[p1] | al[p2]⇒ al[p1 | p2]. Clearly, such a rule is compatible
with Eq 3 from Table 2. Each network term will therefore have the form at1[pt1] | . . . | atn[ptn], where each
location ati is unique and where each pti will represent a set of parallel processes. Any process term which
does not contain the parallel operator at its topmost level is referred to as an atomic process term. Each
individual network location term will have the form ati[pt
1
i | . . . | ptki ], where each ptji is an atomic process
term.
Next we consider how to model the action rules given in Table 2 within our RL model. First, we define
two labelled rules to model the action rule (Move):
[move] al[go(t, al2) then p1 | p2] =⇒ al2[S(p1)] | al[p2]
[move] al[go(t, al2) then p1 | p2] =⇒
al[S (go(t− 1, al2) then p1) | p2] if t > 0
The two rules can both be applied when t > 0 and this leads to a nondeterministic choice between moving
location or allowing time to pass. Note that if t = 0 then only the rule that moves to a different location is
applicable.
To model the synchronisation required for communication as defined by the action rule (Com) we have
the following rule:
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[com] al[out(c, t1) < al1 > then p1 else p2 | in(c, t2)(vl) then p3 else p4 | p5]
=⇒ al[S (p1) | S (p3[vl/al1]) | p5]
This rule makes use of a substitution function @[@/@] : Prs VLoc ALoc → Prs, where pt[vt/at] represents
the process term that results by substituting all free occurrences (not bound by an input action symbol) of
VLoc term vt by the ALoc term at within the process term pt. This function is straightforward to define
algebraically using recursion on process terms.
In any TiMo specification TM there will be process definitions of the form
id(u1, . . . , un : s1, . . . , sn)
df
= Pid
which allow each process identifier id ∈ Id to be associated with a wellformed process expression Pid (see
the action rule (Call) in Table 2). In RL(TM ), for each id ∈ Id we add a rewrite rule of the form:
[calls] al[id(u1, . . . , un) | p]⇒ al[S (RL(Pid)) | p]
where RL(Pid) is the process term that results from translating Pid into RL(TM ) and each ui is a variable
of sort si in RL(TM ). (Note that when this rule is applied the variables u1, . . . , un will be instantiated with
values and therefore any instances of these variables in RL(Pid) will also be instantiated.)
The above labelled rules are collectively referred to as process transition rules and are used to define a
strategy step that represents an update step as follows:
step =⇒ repeat∗(dc(calls,move, com))
The strategy repeatedly applies the three process transition rules and makes use of the dc builtin strategy
as the order the rules are applied in is irrelevant given that they act on disjoint sets of terms.
In TiMo the last step of any derivation involves applying the (Time) action rule which allows time to
progress and removes all stall symbols. We model this by using a function tick(@) : Prs → Prs which is
applied to the terms resulting from step. We define tick recursively as illustrated by the sample rules below:
tick(stop) =⇒ stop
tick(S (p1 )) =⇒ p1
tick(p1 | p2 ) =⇒ tick(p1 ) | tick(p2 )
tick(id(u1 , . . . , un)) =⇒ id(u1 , . . . , un)
tick((out(a, t) < l > then p1 else p2 )) =⇒
(out(a, t − 1 ) < l > then p1 else p2 ) if t > 0
tick((out(a, 0 ) < l > then p1 else p2 )) =⇒ p2
To make the application of this function straightforward we overload tick so that it can be applied to networks
by defining tick(@) : Nets → Nets by
tick(al [p]) =⇒ al [tick(p)], tick(n1 | n2 ) =⇒ tick(n1 ) | tick(n2 )
Note that when using tick we restrict its application to a single location at anyone time to ensure time
progression confirms to the TiMo semantics.
We can now formulate a rewrite rule oneStep in RL(TM ) using the strategy step and function tick that
models a derivation step in TM :
[oneStep] al[p] | n1 =⇒ n3 | n1
where n2 := (step) al [p],
n3 := () tick(n2 )
The pattern al[p] | n1 is used to match nondeterministically with a collection of network components (due
to the associative/commutative property of @ | @) and so chooses the next location to update.
It is interesting to note that different semantic choices can be considered for TiMo by appropriately
updating the oneStep strategy. For example, we could straightforwardly consider a synchronous semantics,
introduce priorities to locations or add fairness assumptions. This provides further motivation for developing
our RL model.
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4.2. Correctness of RL Model
Having developed an RL model for TiMo we now validate that it correctly captures the semantics of TiMo.
We do this by showing that our model is sound (each step in our RL model represents a derivation step in
TiMo) and complete (every derivation step possible in TiMo is represented in our RL model). In the sequel
let TM be a TiMo specification and let RL(TM ) be the corresponding RL model as defined in Section 4.1.
Not all the terms of sort Prs in RL(TM ) represent valid processes in TM since they may contain the
stall symbol S . Another problem can arise with the improper use of location variables, that is terms of sort
VLoc, since all uses other than those in an input command need to be bound by an outer input command.
We formalise what we mean by a valid process term by defining a function VP .
Definition 1 The function VP : T (ΣRL(TM ))Prs × P(T (ΣRL(TM ))VLoc) → B is defined recursively over
the structure of process terms as follows:
VP(stop,VS ) = true
VP(S (pt),VS ) = false
VP(id(v1 , . . . , vn),VS ) =
{
true if vi ∈ V S, for all vi of sort VLoc
false otherwise
VP(go(nt, at) then pt,VS ) = VP(pt,VS )
VP(go(nt, vt) then pt,VS ) = vt ∈ VS ∧VP(pt,VS )
VP(in(ct, nt)(vt) then pt1 else pt2,VS ) = VP(pt1,VS ∪ {vt}) ∧VP(pt2,VS )
VP(out(ct, nt) < vt > then pt1 else pt2,VS ) =
VP(pt1,VS ) ∧ vt ∈ VS ∧VP(pt2,VS )
VP(out(ct, nt) < at > then pt1 else pt2,VS ) = VP(pt1,VS ) ∧VP(pt2,VS )
VP(pt1 | pt2,VS ) = VP(pt1,VS ) ∧VP(pt2,VS ).
We define valPrs(TM ) = {pt | pt ∈ T (ΣRL(TM ))Prs and VP(pt, {}) } to be the set of all valid process
terms and define the set valNet(TM ) of valid network terms recursively by: (1) at[pt] ∈ valNet(TM ) if
pt ∈ valPrs(TM ); and (2) net1 | net2 ∈ valNet(TM ), if net1, net2 ∈ valNet(TM ).
It can be shown that oneStep preserves valid network terms.
Theorem 2 The strategy oneStep is welldefined with respect to valid network terms, i.e. for any
net1 ∈ valNet(TM ), if net1 =⇒ net2 using oneStep then net2 ∈ valNet(TM ).
Proof. By the definition of oneStep it suffices to consider a valid network location term of the form
at[pt1 | . . . | ptn] ∈ valNet(TM ),
where n > 0 and each pti is an atomic process term. It can be seen that each process term pti is involved
in at most one process transition rule application when oneStep is applied. This gives four possible cases to
consider.
Case 1) Suppose pti is not involved in the application of any process transition rules. Then by the def-
inition of oneStep and valNet(TM ) (Definition 1) we need to show that tick(pti) results in a valid process
term. There are three possible subcases to consider:
i) Suppose pti is the process term stop. Then by definition of tick we know tick(stop) rewrites to stop which
is clearly a valid process term.
ii) Suppose pti is the process term tick(out(ct, nt) < vt > then pt
1
i else pt
2
i ). By the definition of tick there
are two possibilities to consider. First, if nt > 0 holds then time is allowed to progress and the resulting
process term out(ct, nt− 1) < vt > then pt1i else pt2i must be valid given that the original output term was.
Secondly, we could have nt = 0 in which case the timer has expired and the resulting process term is pt2i .
Clearly pt2i must be valid given that the original output term was.
iii) Suppose pti is the process term tick(in(ct, nt)(vt) then pt
1
i else pt
2
i ). Then a similar argument to ii) above
can be used, noting that the input operator does not bind vt in pt2i .
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Case 2) Suppose pti has the form id(v1, . . . , vn) and that a [calls] rule is applied to it, i.e.
id(v1, . . . , vn)⇒ S (pt)
where pt is the process term RL(Pid) with variables u1, . . . , un replaced by terms v1, . . . , vn. Clearly the stall
symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function at the end of oneStep. Since Pid was a
wellformed TiMo process expression it is straightforward to show that pt ∈ valPrs(TM ) as required.
Case 3) Suppose pti has the form go(nt, at2) then pt and that a [move] rule is applied to it. Then we
have two possible cases:
i) Suppose that nt > 0 holds and that applying the [move] rule simply allows time to pass, i.e.
go(nt, at2) then pt⇒ S (go(nt− 1, at2) then pt)
Since the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function, it can be seen that
go(nt− 1, at2) then pt must be a valid process term given that the original process term was.
ii) Suppose that applying a [move] rule results in the process moving locations, i.e. produces the network
term at2[S (pt)], which becomes at2[pt)] after applying tick . Since the original atomic process term was valid
it follows that pt must be valid and so the resulting new network term must also be valid as required.
Case 4) Suppose that the [com] rule has been applied to two process terms pti and ptj , for i 6= j. That is,
suppose
out(ct, nt1) < at2 > then pt
1
i else pt
2
i | in(ct, nt2)(vt) then pt1j else pt2j
⇒ S (pt1i ) | S (pt1j [vt/at2])
Then the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function at the end of oneStep. It
follows that pt1i must be a valid process term since the original output term was valid. Also pt
1
j [vt/at2] must
be valid since VP(pt1j , {vt}) must be true as the original input term was valid and as pt1j [vt/at2] is simply
pt1j with all unbounded occurrences of location variable term vt replaced by the actual location term at2. 2
We can define an interpretation mapping between TiMo terms in TM and terms in the corresponding
RL model RL(TM ) as follows.
Definition 3 The process term mapping σPrs : Prs(TM )→ valPrs(TM ) is defined recursively by:
σPrs( stop ) = stop, σPrs(id(v1, . . . , vn)) = id(v1, . . . , vn),
σPrs(go
∆t l then P ) = go(t, l) then σPrs(P ),
σPrs(a
∆t ? (vl : Loc) then P else P ′) =
in(a, t)(vl) then σPrs(P ) else σPrs(P
′),
σPrs(a
∆t ! 〈l〉 then P else P ′) = out(a, t) < l > then σPrs(P ) else σPrs(P ′),
σPrs(P |P ′) = σPrs(P ) | σPrs(P ′).
The network term mapping σNet : Net(TM ) → valNet(TM ) is defined using σPrs by σNet(l [[P ]]) =
l[σPrs(P )] and σNet(N |N ′) = σNet(N) | σNet(N ′).
It is straightforward to show that σPrs and σNet are bijective mappings and thus have inverses. In order
to show the correctness of the RL model we need to prove it is sound and complete with respect to TiMo
(see Figure 2).
We now show that for any TiMo specification TM the RL model RL(TM ) defined in Section 4.1 is a
sound and complete model of TM .
Theorem 4 (Soundness) Let net1, net2 ∈ valNet(TM ) be any valid network terms. Then if net1 =⇒ net2
using the strategy oneStep then σ−1Net(net1)
Ψ
=⇒ σ−1Net(net2) for some finite multiset Ψ = {ψ1 , . . . , ψm} of
l-actions and some location l. In other words, the diagram for soundness in Figure 2 must commute.
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Soundness
net1 net2
N1 N2
-
oneStep
-
Ψ
=⇒
6
σ−1Net
6
σ−1Net Completeness
N1 N2
net1 net2
-
Ψ
=⇒
-oneStep
6
σNet
6
σNet
Fig. 2. The properties of soundness and completeness required for RL(TM ) to be a correct model of the TiMo specification
TM .
Proof. By the definition of oneStep and the notion of a derivation in TiMo it suffices to consider a valid
network location term of the form
at[pt1 | . . . | ptn] ∈ valNet(TM ),
where n > 0 and each pti is an atomic process term. It can be seen that each process term pti is involved in
at most one process transition rule application when oneStep is applied. This gives us four possible cases to
consider.
Case 1) Suppose pti is not involved in the application of any process transition rules during a deriva-
tion using oneStep. Then we need to show that applying a time step in TiMo to the process expression
σ−1Prs(pti) results in the process σ
−1
Prs(tick(pti)). There are three possible subcases to consider:
i) Suppose pti is the process term stop. Then by definition of tick and σ
−1
Prs we have σ
−1
Prs(stop) = stop and
σ−1Prs(tick(stop)) = stop . Then by time progression in TiMo we have at [[ stop ]]
√
at−→ at [[ stop ]] as required.
ii) Suppose pti is the process term out(ct, nt) < at2 > then pt
1
i else pt
2
i . By the definition of tick there are
two possibilities to consider. First, if nt > 0 holds then time is allowed to progress and the resulting process
term is out(ct, nt − 1) < at2 > then pt1i else pt2i . By definition of time progression in TiMo, if nt > 0 we
know
at [[ ct∆nt ! 〈at2〉 then pt1i else pt2i ]]
√
at−→ at [[ ct∆nt−1 ! 〈at2〉 then pt1i else pt2i ]]
as required. Secondly, we could have nt = 0 in which case the timer has expired and the resulting process
term is pt2i . Again, by definition of time progression we know
at [[ ct∆0 ! 〈at2〉 then pt1i else pt2i ]]
√
at−→ at [[ pt2i ]]
as required.
iii) Suppose pti is the process term in(ct, nt)(vt) then pt
1
i else pt
2
i . Then the result follows by a similar
argument to ii) above.
Case 2) Suppose pti has the form id(v1, . . . , vn) and that a [calls] rule is applied to it, i.e.
id(v1, . . . , vn)⇒ S (pt)
where pt is the process term RL(Pid) with variables u1, . . . , un replaced by terms v1, . . . , vn. Note that tick
will remove the stall symbol and so the final atomic process term will be pt. Then by the action rule (Call)
in Table 2 we have
at [[ id(v1, . . . , vn) ]]
id@at−−−−→ at [[sσ−1Prs(pt) ]]
The result follows since the stall symbol s will be removed by the time progression step in TiMo.
Case 3) Suppose pti has the form go(nt, at2) then pt and that a [move] rule is applied to it. Then we
have two possible cases:
i) Suppose that nt > 0 holds and that applying the [move] rule simply allows time to pass, i.e.
go(nt, at2) then pt⇒ S (go(nt− 1, at2) then pt)
Clearly, the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function. In TiMo by the definition
of time progression and the assumption nt > 0 we have
at [[ go∆nt at2 then σ
−1
Prs(pt) ]]
√
at−−→ at [[ go∆nt−1 at2 then σ−1Prs(pt) ]]
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as required.
ii) Suppose that applying a [move] rule results in the process moving locations, i.e. produces the network
term at2[S (pt)]. Clearly, the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function. Then by
the action rule (Move) in Table 2 we have
at [[ go∆nt at2 then σ
−1
Prs(pt) ]]
at2@at−−−−→ at2 [[sσ−1Prs(pt) ]]
The results follows since the stall symbol s will be removed by the time progression step in TiMo.
Case 4) Suppose that the [com] rule has been applied to two process terms pti and ptj , for i 6= j. That is,
suppose
out(ct, nt1) < at2 > then pt
1
i else pt
2
i | in(ct, nt2)(vt) then pt1j else pt2j
⇒ S (pt1i ) | S (pt1j [vt/at2])
The instances of the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function at the end of
oneStep. Then by the action rule (Com) in Table 2 we have
at [[ ct∆nt1 ! 〈at2〉 then σ−1Prs(pt1i ) else σ−1Prs(pt2i ) | ct∆nt2 ? (vt : Loc)
then σ−1Prs(pt
1
j ) else σ
−1
Prs(pt
2
j ) ]]
ct<at2>@at−−−−−−−−→ at [[sσ−1Prs(pt1i ) | s{at2/vt}σ−1Prs(pt1j ) ]]
The result follows since the stall symbol s will be removed by the time progression step in TiMo and since
we can show σ−1Prs(pt
1
j [vt/at2]) = {at2/vt}σ−1Prs(pt1j ). 2
Theorem 5 (Completeness) Let N1, N2 ∈ Net(TM ) be any wellformed network terms in TM . Then,
if N1
Ψ
=⇒ N2, for some location l and some multi-set Ψ = {ψ1 , . . . , ψm} of l-actions, then σNet(N1) =⇒
σNet(N2) using oneStep. In other words, the diagram for completeness in Figure 2 commutes.
Proof. By the definition of a derivation in TiMo and the strategy oneStep it suffices to consider a well
formed network of the form
at [[P1 | . . . | Pn ]] ≡ at [[P1 ]] | . . . | at [[Pn ]],
where n > 0 and each Pi is an atomic process. Suppose at [[P1 | . . . | Pn ]] Ψ=⇒ N ′, for some finite set of
atactions Ψ = {ψ1 , . . . , ψm}, m ≥ 0. Then it can be seen that each atomic process Pi is involved in at
most one ataction ψi . We show that the ataction applied to each process Pi is correctly captured by the
oneStep strategy in the RL model. We have four possible cases to consider.
Case 1): Suppose Pi is not involved in any of the action rules (Call), (Move) and (Com) during the
derivation step. That is at [[Pi ]]
√
l−−→ at [[P ′i ]], where at [[P ′i ]] = φl(at [[Pi ]]). Then by definition of oneStep we
need to show that tick(σPrs(Pi)) results in the process σPrs(P
′
i ). Considering the possible form of Pi gives
us three subcases to consider:
i) Suppose Pi is the process stop . Then φl(at [[ stop ]]) = at [[ stop ]] by definition of φl and we have
σPrs( stop ) = stop and σPrs(φl( stop )) = stop. It follows by the definition of tick that tick(stop) = stop as
required.
ii) Suppose Pi is the process ct
∆nt ! 〈at2〉 then P 1i else P 2i . Then
σPrs(Pi) = out(ct, nt) < at2 > then σPrs(P
1
i ) else σPrs(P
2
i ).
By the definition of time progression in TiMo there are two possibilities to consider. First, if nt > 0 then
time is allowed to progress resulting in the process
ct∆nt−1 ! 〈at2〉 then P 1i else P 2i
Applying σPrs to this process gives out(ct, nt − 1) < at2 > then σPrs(P 1i ) else σPrs(P 2i ) and so by the
definition of tick the result follows. Secondly, we could have nt = 0 in which case the timer has expired and
the resulting process is P 2i . Again, by definition of tick it can be seen that the result follows.
iii) Suppose Pi is the process ct
∆nt ? (vt : Loc) then P 1j else P
2
j . Then the result follows by a similar argu-
ment to ii) above.
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Case 2) Suppose Pi is the process id(v1, . . . , vn) and that the action rule (Call) is applied, i.e.
at [[ id(v1, . . . , vn) ]]
id@at−−−−→ at [[s{~v/~u}Pid ]]
where the stall symbol s is removed by the final time progression step. We have σPrs(id(v1, . . . , vn)) =
id(v1, . . . , vn) and so applying the [calls] rule to this term gives
id(v1, . . . , vn)⇒ S (pt)
where pt is the process term σPrs(Pid) with variables u1, . . . , un replaced by terms v1, . . . , vn. Note that tick
will remove the stall symbol and so the final atomic process term will be pt. It is straightforward to see that
σPrs({~v/~u}Pid) = pt as required.
Case 3) Suppose Pi has the form go
∆nt at2 then P
′. Then we have
σPrs(go
∆nt at2 then P
′) = go(nt, at2) then σPrs(P ′)
By the definition of a derivation in TiMo we have two possible cases:
i) Suppose that nt > 0 holds and that the action rule (Move) has not been applied and instead time has
been allowed to progress, i.e.
at [[ go∆nt at2 then P
′ ]]
√
at−−→ at [[ go∆nt−1 at2 then P ′ ]]
This can be modelled by applying the appropriate [move] rule
go(nt, at2) then σPrs(P
′)⇒ S (go(nt− 1, at2) then σPrs(P ′))
where the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function. It is straightforward to see
that
σPrs(go
∆nt−1 at2 then P ′) = go(nt− 1, at2) then σPrs(P ′)
as required.
ii) Suppose the action rule (Move) was applied to Pi
at [[ go∆nt at2 then P
′ ]] at2@at−−−−→ at2 [[sP ′ ]]
where the stall symbol s is removed by the final time step. This can be copied in the RL model by applying
the appropriate [move] rule
at[go(nt, at2) then σPrs(P
′)]⇒ at2[S (σPrs(P ′))]
Clearly, the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function. It is then straightforward
to see that
σNet(at2 [[P
′ ]]) = at2[σPrs(P ′)]
by the definition of σPrs .
Case 4) Suppose the action rule (Com) has been applied to two processes Pi and Pj , for i 6= j, i.e.
at [[ ct∆nt1 ! 〈at2〉 then P 1i else P 2i | ct∆nt2 ? (vt : Loc) then P 1j else P 2j ) ]]
ct<at2>@at−−−−−−−−→ at [[sP 1i | s{at2/vt}P 1j ]]
where the stall symbols s will be removed by the final time step. Then we have
σPrs(ct
∆nt1 ! 〈at2〉 then P 1i else P 2i | ct∆nt2 ? (vt : Loc) then P 1j else P 2j ))
= out(ct, nt1) < at2 > then σPrs(P
1
i ) else σPrs(P
2
i ) | in(ct, nt2)(vt) then σPrs(P 1j ) else σPrs(P 2j )
by definition of the term mapping. By applying the [com] rule we have
out(ct, nt1) < at2 > then σPrs(P
1
i ) else σPrs(P
2
i ) | in(ct, nt2)(vt) then
σPrs(P
1
j ) else σPrs(P
2
j ) ⇒ S (σPrs(P 1i )) | S (σPrs(P 1j )[vt/at2])
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where all occurrences of the stall symbol S will be removed by the tick function. It is then straightforward
to see that
σPrs(P
1
i | {at2/vt}P 1j ) = σPrs(P 1i ) | σPrs(P 1j )[vt/at2]
by definition of σPrs and since we can show σPrs({at2/vt}P 1j ) = σPrs(P 1j )[vt/at2]. 2
4.3. An Illustrative Example
In this section we investigate using Elan [BKKMR98, BKKM02], a strategy-based rewrite system, to im-
plement a TiMo specification based on our RL model. We consider a small example which provides useful
insight into the RL modelling approach used and illustrates the type of (behavioural) properties that can be
analysed.
Recall the simple TiMo workflow example introduced in Section 2. The specification WF can be mapped
into an RL model RL(WF ) as described in Section 4.1 and then investigated using Elan to provide insight
into the behaviour of the original TiMo specification. A range of (behavioural) properties can be analysed
including time constraints, use of locations, and causality between actions. For example, consider the following
initial TiMo network:
Init [[ job | serv(Web) ]] | Web [[ serv(Done) ]]
After translating this into RL(WF ) we can use Elan to derive the following rewriting trace which shows
how a processing job can reach the Done location:
Init [job | serv(Web)] | Web[serv(Done)]
=⇒
Init [in(a, 1)(WL) then go(1,WL) then job else job | out(a, 2) < Web > then
serv(Web) else serv(Web)] | Web[serv(Done)]
=⇒
Init [go(1,Web) then job | serv(Web)] | Web[serv(Done)]
=⇒
Init [out(a, 2) < Web > then serv(Web) else serv(Web)] | Web[job | serv(Done)]
=⇒
Init [out(a, 2) < Web > then serv(Web) else serv(Web)] | Web[in(a, 1)(WL) then
go(1,WL) then job else job | out(a, 2) < Done > then serv(Done)
else serv(Done)]
=⇒
Init [out(a, 2) < Web > then serv(Web) else serv(Web)] |
Web[go(1,Done) then job | serv(Done)]
=⇒
Init [out(a, 2) < Web > then serv(Web) else serv(Web)] |
Web[out(a, 2) < Done > then serv(Done) else serv(Done)] | Done[job]
The example trace contains six derivation steps and indeed it is easy to verify using Elan that this is
the smallest number of steps needed in order for a processing job starting at Init to reach the Done location.
Next we consider what happens if we change our network so that it contains a faulty service process:
Init [[ job | serv(Web) ]] | Web [[ servErr(Done) ]]
Again, using Elan and a simple search strategy we are able to confirm that it is still possible for a processing
job to reach the Done location. Furthermore, we can show that it is now possible for a processing job to end
up in the Err location as the following term derived using Elan shows:
Init [out(a, 2) < Web > then serv(Web) else serv(Web)] |
Web[out(a, 2) < Err > then servErr(Err) else servErr(Err)] | Err [job]
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5. Extending the Semantics with Access Permissions
In a distributed environment, processes need to possess sufficient access rights to migrate and communicate;
moreover, such access permissions can dynamically change. In this section, we outline PerTiMo [CiK11b,
CiK14] which extendsTiMo with interprocess communication controlled by access permissions that processes
must possess in order to send and receive information. Access permissions are dynamic and processes can
acquire new access permissions, or lose some of their current access permissions while moving between
locations, modelling an important security feature.
To communicate over a channel at a given network location, the sender process should have a `put' access
permission, and the receiving process a `get' access permission. In general, the set of access permissions Γ of
a process is a subset of the overall set of access permissions:
AccPerm
df
= {put, get} × Chan × Loc
We use the notation get〈a@l〉 to denote an access permission (get, a, l) ∈ AccPerm and put〈a@l〉 to denote
(put, a, l) ∈ AccPerm. Intuitively, we work with access permissions to sockets where l represents an IP
address and a represents a communication port. Access permissions of a process change while moving from
one location to another. To model this, we use the following four basic access permission modification
operations:
put+a@l get
+
a@l put
−
a@l get
−
a@l
where l is a location and a is a communication channel. The first two (put+a@l and get
+
a@l) add access
permissions, while the latter two (put−a@l and get
−
a@l) remove access permissions. For instance,
put+a@l(Γ) = Γ ∪ {put〈a@l〉}
Then an access permission modification operation is either the identity on AccPerm, or a composition of
some basic access permission modification operations such that if put+a@l is used in the composition then
put−a@l is not used (giving and at the same time removing an access permission does not make sense). For
instance,
get+a@l ◦ put−b@l′(Γ) = Γ ∪ {get〈a@l〉} \ {put〈b@l′〉}
For a given network, we then specify what are the changes to the access permission sets of processes migrating
from one location to another. This is specified as an access permission modification mapping apmod which, for
each pair of locations, returns a permission modification operation. Hence, if a process with the current access
permissions Γ moves from location l to location l′, its new set of access permissions becomes apmod(l, l′)(Γ).
The syntax of PerTiMo extends that of TiMo with the notion of processes with access permissions
PP ::= P : Γ p PP |PP ′
where P is a process defined exactly as in Table 1 and Γ is a set of access permissions. Networks are then
re-defined in the following way:
N ::= l [[PP ]] p N |N ′
Thus a network l [[P : Γ ]] specifies a process P with the access permissions Γ running at the location l. Other
syntactic notions and assumptions are as those defined for TiMo, with obvious modifications resulting from
the additions of sets of access permissions.
The computational steps N
Ψ
=⇒ N ′ of PerTiMo networks are defined following the same scheme as
in the case of TiMo networks, except that some of the execution rules of Table 2 are modified to reflect
the fact that now processes appearing in networks are equipped with sets of access permissions, and one
new structural rule is added. Table 3 provides the necessary details. Two crucial rules there are (MoveP)
and (ComP). The former reflects the change of access permissions applied to a migrating process, and the
latter expresses the assumption that communications (send or receive) can only happen if processes possess
suitable access permissions.
Note that now in the rule (Time), N 6→l means that the rules (CallP) and (ComP) as well as (MoveP)
with ∆t = ∆0 cannot be applied to N for this particular location l. Moreover, φl(N) is obtained by
taking the component decomposition of N and simultaneously replacing all the components of the form
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(Eq4) l [[P |Q : Γ ]] ≡ l [[P : Γ |Q : Γ ]]
(CallP) l [[ id(~v) : Γ ]]
id@l−→ l [[s {~v/~u}Pid : Γ ]]
(MoveP) l [[ go∆t l′ then P : Γ ]] l.l
′
−→ l′ [[sP : apmod(l, l′)(Γ) ]]
(ComP)
put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ′ ~v ∈∏ ~X
l [[ a∆t ! 〈~v〉 then P else Q : Γ | a∆t′ ? (~u: ~X) then P ′ else Q′ : Γ′ ]]
a〈~v〉@l
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ l [[sP : Γ | s {~v/~u}P ′ : Γ′ ]]
Table 3. An additional structural equivalence rule of PerTiMo, and four modified action rules.
Safe
Other
Check Area
PPPPPq

1
-
Fig. 3. A pictorial representation of a simple PerTiMo access permission example.
l [[ go∆t l′ then P : Γ ]] by l [[ go∆t−1 l′ then P : Γ ]], and all components of the form l [[ a∆tω then P elseQ : Γ ]]
(where ω stands for ! 〈~v〉 or ? (~u: ~X)) by l [[Q : Γ ]] if t = 0, and l [[ a∆t−1ω then P else Q : Γ ]] otherwise.
After that, all the occurrences of the symbol s in N are erased.
Similarly, as for TiMo, all PerTiMo networks directly reachable from a well-formed network also are
well-formed, and so computational steps N
Ψ
=⇒ N ′ are well-defined evolutions of well-formed networks (see
[CiK11b, CiK14]). Moreover, it is important to stress again that the semantical treatment of PerTiMo
goes beyond interleaving semantics by introducing an explicit representation of maximal concurrency in the
execution of actions.
We would like to stress that the above presentation of PerTiMo is semantically equivalent to that used
in [CiK11b, CiK14], even though the formalisation of the operational rules is slightly different, as we decided
to keep the (Time) rule used in the formulation of TiMo.
As an illustrative example, consider a simple example in which processes attempt to gain access to a
secure location. Only those processes that come initially from a trusted location Safe are allowed to obtain
the address of the secure location Area with processes from other originating locations being blocked. A
pictorial representation of this example is given in Figure 3. The PerTiMo specification CheckAP consists
of four locations: Safe; Other ; Check ; and Area. It contains two process definitions:
req
df
= go∆1 Check then a∆1 ? (l :Loc) then go∆1 l then stop else stop
chk
df
= a∆2 ! 〈Area〉 then chk else chk
Finally, the access permission modification operator is defined as follows:
apmod(Safe,Check) = get+a@Check ,
apmod(Other ,Check) = get−a@Check ,
apmod(Check ,Area) = get−a@Check ,
with all other combinations of input locations returning the identity function. Then an example of a Per-
TiMo network would be
Safe [[ req :  ]] | Other [[ req : {get〈a@Check〉} ]] | Check [[ chk : {put〈a@Check〉} ]]
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(TMove)
apmod(l, l′)(Γ) `l′ P
Γ `l go∆t l′ then P (TStop) Γ `l stop
(TOut)
put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ Γ `l P Γ `l Q
Γ `l a∆t ! 〈~v〉 then P else Q (TPar)
Γ `l P Γ `l Q
Γ `l P |Q
(TIn)
get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ∀~v ∈∏ ~X : Γ `l {~v/~u}P Γ `l Q
Γ `l a∆t ? (~u: ~X) then P else Q
(TRec)
Γ `l id(~v)↑H
Γ `l id(~v)
Table 4. Derivation rules for processes with safe access permissions. In the rule (TStop), Γ is any set of access permissions.
The constant H in the rule (TRec) for recursive processes is equal to 2 · |Loc| · (1 +∑id∈Id |Xid1 | · . . . · |Xidmid |). For all id ∈ Id ,
n ≥ 0 and ~v ∈ ∏ ~Xid (where ∏ ~Xid stands for Xid1 × · · · ×Xidmid ), the n-th unfolding of id(~v) is given by id(~v)↑n df= stop if
n = 0, and id(~v)↑n df= P if n > 0, where P is obtained from {~v/~u}Pid by replacing each subexpression of the form id ′(~w) with
id ′(~w)↑n−1. Moreover, stop ↑n df= stop .
5.1. Safe Access Permissions
One of the problems which is central to designs expressed in PerTiMo is to ensure that a migrating process
possesses a sufficiently rich set of initial access permissions so that whenever it attempts to communicate over
a channel, it has the required access permission, irrespective of the other processes used in the construction
of the system. (We then say that the process has safe access permissions.) This can be verified by taking
into account that migrating processes have their access permission sets modified according to the mapping
apmod . As a result, one can provide a solution to an important security problem related to migration and
access permissions in the sense that one should rule out unauthorised attempts to communicate over the
channels.
The solution provided in [CiK11b, CiK14], uses judgements of the form
Γ `l P (1)
to mean that a single-component well-formed network l [[P :Γ ]] has safe access permissions. Note that it
may be impossible to find Γ satisfying (1), for a given P and l, due to conflicts between access permission
modifications resulting from migration and the subsequent communication. For example, if
P = go∆0 l′ then a∆1 ! 〈1〉 then stop else stop
and apmod(l, l′) = put−a@l′ then there is no Γ such that Γ `l P .
Given a set of locations Loc together with the apmod mapping, as well as a process P and location l, one
can devise typing rules for checking that a set of access permissions Γ satisfies (1). These rules are given in
Table 4.
Returning to our PerTiMo example specification CheckAP , we can observe that the process contained
within Safe [[ req :  ]] has safe access permissions, by applying the derivation rules of Table 4, in the following
way. First we observe that for any PerTiMo system, and for any Γ, l and l′ we have:
Γ `l go∆1 l′ then stop (2)
Indeed, by (TStop) we have
apmod(l, l′)(Γ) `l′ stop
Hence, by (TMove), (2) holds. We then observe that by (2) and (TStop), we have in our case:
{get〈a@Check〉} `Check go∆1 Check then stop
{get〈a@Check〉} `Check go∆1 Safe then stop
{get〈a@Check〉} `Check go∆1 Other then stop
{get〈a@Check〉} `Check go∆1 Area then stop
{get〈a@Check〉} `Check stop
Hence, by (TIn), we obtain
{get〈a@Check〉} `Check a∆1 ? (l :Loc) then go∆1 l then stop else stop
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and so, by (TMove), we have
 `Safe go∆1 Check then a∆1 ? (l :Loc) then go∆1 l then stop else stop
Finally, by (TRec),
 `Safe req
Note that it is not possible to establish that
{get〈a@Check〉} `Other req
Indeed, for this to hold we must have, by (TRec),
{get〈a@Check〉} `Other go∆1 Check then a∆1 ? (l :Loc) then go∆1 l then stop else stop
In turn, for this to hold, we must have, by (TMove),
 `Check a∆1 ? (l :Loc) then go∆1 l then stop else stop
which clearly does not hold, by (TIn).
In the general case, a well-formed network N has safe access permissions if each of its parallel components
has safe access permissions. Crucially, one can then show that networks with safe access permissions capture
the desired notion of a guarantee of correct access to communication channels. More precisely, if N is a
network reachable from a well-formed network with safe access permissions, then the following hold.
• If l [[ a∆t ! 〈~v〉 then P else Q : Γ ]] is a parallel component of N , then put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ.
• If l [[ a∆t ? (~u: ~X) then P else Q : Γ ]] is a parallel component of N , then get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ.
Moreover, one can also show that networks with safe access permissions are the only ones which enjoy the
above properties regardless of an environment in which they are placed. We can therefore conclude that
PerTiMo provides a sound and complete framework for ensuring safety of communication for networks of
migrating processes. In particular, if safe access permissions for a part of a network can be established, one
can simplify the checking of access permissions in the rule (ComP), simplifying the operational semantics
rules for this part of the network and its descendants.
The notion of safe access permissions is powerful, but it may prove too restrictive for practical applications
where safe access permissions are guaranteed thanks, for example, to the specific timings of the processes
involved, even though there may be environments in which illegal access may occur. For this we need a finer
behavioural analysis. In particular, it can be done by extending the technique developed earlier in this paper,
as discussed in the next section.
5.2. Extending the RL Model to PerTiMo
In this section we consider extending our RL model of TiMo by incorporating access permissions. We show
that the resulting RL model correctly captures the semantics of PerTiMo and thus provides an important
basis for mechanising reasoning about PerTiMo models.
Given a PerTiMo specification TMP we consider how to develop a corresponding RL model RL(TMP)
that correctly captures the meaning of TMP . The idea is to extend our RL model of the TiMo aspects of
TMP by defining an appropriate RL specification for sets of access permissions. This involves introducing a
range of new sorts and operations; the sort APType is introduced with associated constants put : APType
and get : APType to represent the two permission types. Next the sort AP is added to represent access
permissions. This sort has a constructor
AP (@,@,@) : APType Chan ALoc → AP .
So, for example, AP (put , a, l) represent an access permission to output data on a channel a when in location
l. Sets of access permissions are represented by sort APSet which has constant  : AP for the empty set,
the embedding operation @ : AP → APSet to lift access permissions to singleton sets, a set union operation
∪ : APSet APSet → APSet , and an operation (@ in @) : AP APSet → bool for checking if an access
permission is in a set or not (all of above are equationally axiomatised in the standard way [EhM85, MeT92]).
Given the above abstract data type we can then associate a set of access permissions with a process and
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update the definition of networks so that they contain this new type of process. We introduce a new sort
PrsAP for processes with access permissions and add a constructor
(@ : @) : Prs APSet → PrsAP
which pairs up processes and sets of access permissions. A (commutative, associative) parallel composition
operator @|@ : PrsAP PrsAP → PrsAP is added for processes with access permissions. The structural
rules allow the conditional bi-directional transfer between the normal process parallel composition operator
and this new operator (see Table 3). We take the approach of prioritizing the new composition operator for
processes with access permissions to simplify the model construction and so introduce the rule:
(p1 | p2 : aps) =⇒ (p1 : aps) | (p2 : aps)
The stall S and time progression tick functions can be lifted to processes with access permissions in the
obvious way.
Network terms in the RL model are now extended so that they are based on processes with access
permissions:
@[@] : ALoc PrsAP → Nets
In order to model the apmod function, used in PerTiMo to record the permission updates that occur
when a process migrates, we introduce a function apm(@,@)(@) : ALoc ALoc APSet → APSet . For a given
PerTiMo example, appropriate rules need to be given to specify the behaviour of this function and to
facilitate this we introduce functions
putAdd , putSub, getAdd , getSub : APSet Chan ALoc → APSet
to model the basic access permission modification operators put+a@l, get
+
a@l, put
−
a@l, and get
−
a@l found in
PerTiMo. The following rules for putAdd and putSub illustrate how these operators are axiomatised:
putAdd(Γ, a, l)⇒ Γ ∪ {AP (a, l, put)},
putSub(, a, l)⇒ ,
putSub(AP (a, l, put), a, l)⇒ ,
putSub(APVar , a, l)⇒ APVar if notEq(APVar , AP (a, l, put))
putSub(AP (a, l, put) ∪ Γ, a, l)⇒ putSub(Γ, a, l),
putSub(APVar ∪ Γ, a, l)⇒ APVar ∪ putSub(Γ, a, l) if notEq(APVar , AP (a, l, put))
where notEq(ap1, ap2) is a Boolean function which checks whether two access permissions are different.
We now need to consider how to modify the RL model to take account of the changes made to the action
rules in PerTiMo (see Table 3). By carefully considering Table 3 we observe that only the (Move) and
(Com) rules have to be substantially revised. We modify the rule labelled [move] which models the action
rule (Move) in TiMo so that it updates the access permission set associated with the process which is
migrating:
[moveP ] al[(go(t, al2) then p1 : aps) | pp] =⇒ al2[S(p1 : apm(al, al2)(aps))] | al[pp]
where aps is a variable of sort APSet representing a set of access permissions and pp is a variable of sort
PrsAP representing a process associated with an access permission set. The remaining rule that allows time
to pass requires only a slight modification (shown to illustrate the minor changes required to most rules):
[moveP ] al[(go(t, al2) then p1 : aps) | pp] =⇒
al[S(go(t− 1, al2) then p1 : aps) | pp] if t > 0
The rule labelled [calls] for modelling the action rule (Calls) on process definitions needs a slight
modification and becomes:
[callsP ] al[(id(u1, . . . , un) : aps) | pp]⇒ al[S(RL(Pid) : aps) | pp]
where id(u1, . . . , un : s1, . . . , sn)
df
= Pid and RL(Pid) is the process term that results from translating Pid
into RL(TMP).
The final action rule that needs significantly extending is the communication action rule (Com). The
existing RL rule is extended to the following conditional rule:
20 G. Ciobanu, M. Koutny and L.J. Steggles
[comP ] al[(out(c, t1) < al1 > then p1 else p2 : aps1 ) | (in(c, t2)(vl) then p3 else p4 : aps2 ) | pp]
=⇒ al[S(p1 : aps1 ) | S(p3[vl/al1] : aps2 ) | pp]
if (AP (put , c, al) in aps1 ) and (AP (get , c, al) in aps2 )
The above updated process transition rules can then be combined as before into a strategy stepP that
captures the maximal concurrent update step that occurs in a derivation step in PerTiMo:
stepP =⇒ repeat∗(dc(callsP ,moveP , comP))
We can then combine the above parts into a rewrite rule oneStepP which extends the previous rule oneStep
for TiMo to take account of access permissions:
[oneStepP ] al[pp] | n1 =⇒ n3 | n1
where n2 := (stepP) al [pp],
n3 := () tick(n2 )
The above allows PerTiMo network specifications to be mapped to a corresponding RL model which
can then be simulated and analysed using a rewriting tool such as Elan [BKKMR98, BKKM02]. A simple
illustrative example of this is presented in Section 5.3 below. What now remains is to show formally that
the proposed mapping into RL correctly preserves the semantics of PerTiMo.
Recall that for any TiMo model TM we defined valNet(TM ) to denote the set of valid RL network
terms (see Definition 1). We can extend this definition to the RL model of PerTiMo as follows: the set
valNet(TMP) of valid network terms for a PerTiMo specification TMP is defined recursively by: (1)
at[(pt : aps)] ∈ valNet(TMP) if pt ∈ valPrs(TMP) (where valPrs(TMP) is defined as in Definition 1)
and aps ∈ T (ΣRL(TMP))APSet ; and (2) net1 | net2 ∈ valNet(TMP), if net1, net2 ∈ valNet(TMP).
It can be shown that oneStepP preserves valid network terms.
Theorem 6 The strategy oneStepP is welldefined with respect to valid network terms, i.e. for any
net1 ∈ valNet(TMP), if net1 =⇒ net2 using oneStepP then net2 ∈ valNet(TMP).
Proof. The proof follows along similar lines to Theorem 2 and makes use of the fact that PerTiMo acts
only to restrict the communication actions possible in a derivation step. 2
The term interpretation mapping σNet : Net(TM ) → valNet(TM ) introduced in Definition 3 for TiMo
can be extended to PerTiMo as follows.
Definition 7 The access permission term mapping σAP : AccPerm → T (ΣRL(TMP))AP is defined by:
σAP (put〈a@l〉) = AP (a, l, put), σAP (get〈a@l〉) = AP (a, l, get)
In a slight abuse of notation, we also let σAP ({ap1, . . . , apn}) denote the lifting of σAP to sets of access
permissions, defined by
σAP () = , σAP ({ap1, . . . , apn}) = σAP (ap1) ∪ · · · ∪ σAP (apn)
The network term mapping σNet : Net(TMP)→ valNet(TMP) can then be defined by
σNet(l [[P : Γ ]]) = l[σPrs(P ) : σAP (Γ)], σNet(N |N ′) = σNet(N) | σNet(N ′)
To establish the correctness of the RL model we need to prove it is sound and complete with respect to
PerTiMo (see Figure 4 for a pictorial representation of these correctness properties).
Theorem 8 (Soundness) Let net1, net2 ∈ valNet(TMP) be any valid network terms. Then if net1 =⇒ net2
using the strategy oneStepP then σ−1Net(net1)
Ψ
=⇒ σ−1Net(net2) for some finite multiset Ψ = {ψ1 , . . . , ψm} of
l-actions and some location l. In other words, the diagram for soundness in Figure 4 commutes.
Proof. The proof follows a similar structure to the proof of Theorem 4 and relies on the fact that for
a valid network location term of the form
at[(pt1 : aps1) | . . . | (ptn : apsn)] ∈ valNet(TMP),
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Fig. 4. The soundness and completeness properties required for RL(TMP) to be a correct model of a PerTiMo specification
TMP .
each atomic process term (pti : apsi) is involved in at most one process transition rule application when
oneStepP is applied. This gives us four possible cases to consider for each (pti : apsi): 1) no process transition
rule is applied and time simply progresses; 2) [callsP ] rule is applied; 3) [moveP ] rule is applied; and 4)
[comsP ] rule is applied. Cases 1) and 2) are straightforward adaptations of the cases in the proof of Theorem 4
and so we focus on the remaining two cases here.
For Case 3), suppose pti has the form go(nt, at
′) then npt and that a [moveP ] rule is applied to migrate
the process to a new location resulting in the network term at′[S(npt : apm(at, at′)(apsi))]. Clearly, the stall
symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function. Then by the action rule (MoveP) in Table
3 we must have
at [[ go∆nt at′ then σ−1Prs(npt) : σ
−1
AP (apsi) ]]
at.at′−→ at′ [[sσ−1Prs(npt) : apmod(at, at′)(σ−1AP (apsi)) ]]
Since we can show that
σ−1AP (apm(at, at2)(apsi)) = apmod(at, at
′)(σ−1AP (apsi))
it follows that
at [[ go∆nt at′ then σ−1Prs(npt) : σ
−1
AP (apsi) ]]
at.at′−→ at′ [[sσ−1Prs(npt) : σ−1AP (apm(at, at2)(apsi)) ]]
The result then follows since the stall symbol s will be removed by the time progression step in PerTiMo.
For Case 4), suppose that the [comP ] rule has been applied to two process terms pti and ptj , for i 6= j.
That is, suppose
(out(ct, nt1) < at2 > then pt
1
i else pt
2
i : apsi) | (in(ct, nt2)(vt) then pt1j else pt2j : apsj)
⇒ S(pt1i : apsi) | S(pt1j [vt/at2] : apsj)
The instances of the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function at the end of
oneStep. Clearly, for the above conditional rule [comP ] to be applicable the condition (AP (put , ct, at) in apsi)
and (AP (get , ct, at) in apsj) must have evaluated to true. Then it follows by the definition of the term
mapping and RL(TMP) that put〈ct@at〉 ∈ σ−1AP (apsi) and get〈ct@at〉 ∈ σ−1AP (apsj) must hold. By the action
rule (ComP) in Table 3 we then have
at [[ ct∆nt1 ! 〈at2〉 then σ−1Prs(pt1i ) else σ−1Prs(pt2i ) : σ−1AP (apsi) |
ct∆nt2 ? (vt : Loc) then σ−1Prs(pt
1
j ) else σ
−1
Prs(pt
2
j ) : σ
−1
AP (apsj) ]]
ct<at2>@at−−−−−−−−→ at [[sσ−1Prs(pt1i ) : σ−1AP (apsi) | s{at2/vt}σ−1Prs(pt1j ) : σ−1AP (apsj) ]]
The result then follows since the stall symbol s will be removed by the time progression step in PerTiMo
and since we can show σ−1Prs(pt
1
j [vt/at2]) = {at2/vt}σ−1Prs(pt1j ). 2
Theorem 9 (Completeness) Let N1, N2 ∈ Net(TMP) be any wellformed network terms in TMP . Then,
if N1
Ψ
=⇒ N2, for some location l and some multi-set Ψ = {ψ1 , . . . , ψm} of l-actions, then σNet(N1) =⇒
σNet(N2) using oneStepP . In other words, the diagram for completeness in Figure 4 commutes.
Proof. The proof follows a similar structure to the proof of Theorem 5 and relies on a case analysis of
the possible action taken to update each atomic process in a derivation step. It suffices to consider a well-
formed PerTiMo network of the form at [[P1 : Γ1 | . . . | Pn : Γn ]] where n > 0 and each Pi is an atomic
process. Now suppose
at [[P1 : Γ1 | . . . | Pn : Γn ]] Ψ=⇒ N ′,
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for some finite set of atactions Ψ = {ψ1 , . . . , ψm}, m ≥ 0. Then it can be seen that each atomic process
Pi is involved in at most one ataction ψi . We need to show that the ataction applied to each process Pi
is correctly captured by the oneStepP strategy in RL(TMP). There are four possible cases to consider for
each process Pi: 1) None of the action rules (CallP), (MoveP) and (ComP) are applied in the derivation
step; 2) The action rule (CallP) is applied; 3) The action rule (MoveP) is applied; and 4) The action rule
(ComP) is applied. Cases 1) and 2) are straightforward adaptations of the cases in the proof of Theorem 5
and so we focus on the interesting aspects of Cases 3) and 4) here.
In Case 3), suppose Pi has the form go
∆nt at′ then P ′. Then we have
σPrs(go
∆nt at′ then P ′) = go(nt, at′) then σPrs(P ′)
Suppose the action rule (MoveP) was applied to Pi
at [[ go∆nt at′ then P ′ : Γi ]]
at.at′−→ at′ [[sP ′ : apmod(at, at′)(Γi) ]]
where the stall symbol s is removed by the final time step. Then this can be copied in the RL model by
applying the appropriate [moveP ] rule
at[(go(nt, at′) then σPrs(P ′) : σAP (Γi))]⇒ at′[S(σPrs(P ′) : apm(at, at′)(σAP (Γi)))]
Clearly, the stall symbol S will be removed by the application of the tick function. The result then follows
since we can show σNet(at
′ [[P ′ : apmod(at, at′)(Γi) ]]) = at′[(σPrs(P ′) : apm(at, at′)(σAP (Γi)))] using the
definition of the term mapping and RL(TMP).
In Case 4), suppose the action rule (ComP) has been applied to two processes Pi and Pj , for i 6= j, i.e.
at [[ ct∆nt1 ! 〈at′〉 then P 1i else P 2i : Γi | ct∆nt2 ? (vt : Loc) then P 1j else P 2j ) : Γj ]]
ct<at′>@at−−−−−−−−→ at [[sP 1i : Γi | s{at′/vt}P 1j : Γj ]]
where the stall symbols s will be removed by the final time step. Now we have
σNet(at [[ ct
∆nt1 ! 〈at′〉 then P 1i else P 2i : Γi | ct∆nt2 ? (vt : Loc) then P 1j else P 2j : Γj) ]])
= at[(out(ct, nt1) < at
′ > then σPrs(P 1i ) else σPrs(P
2
i ) : σAP (Γi)) |
(in(ct, nt2)(vt) then σPrs(P
1
j ) else σPrs(P
2
j ) : σAP (Γj))]
by the definition of σNet . Clearly, we must have that put〈ct@at〉 ∈ Γi and get〈ct@at〉 ∈ Γj if the (ComP)
action rule has been applied. It follows that (AP (put , ct, at) in σAP (Γi)) and (AP (get , ct, at) in σAP (Γj))
must also hold by definition of the term mapping and RL(TMP). We can therefore apply the [comP ] rule
at[(out(ct, nt1) < at
′ > then σPrs(P 1i ) else σPrs(P
2
i ) : σAP (Γi)) |
(in(ct, nt2)(vt) then σPrs(P
1
j ) else σPrs(P
2
j ) : σAP (Γj))]
⇒ at[S(σPrs(P 1i ) : σAP (Γi)) | S(σPrs(P 1j )[vt/at′] : σAP (Γj))]
where all occurrences of the stall symbol S will be removed by the tick function. It is then straightforward
to see that
σNet(at [[P
1
i : Γi | {at′/vt}P 1j : Γj ]]) = at[(σPrs(P 1i ) : σAP (Γi)) | (σPrs(P 1j )[vt/at′] : σAP (Γj))]
by definition of σNet and since we can show σPrs({at′/vt}P 1j ) = σPrs(P 1j )[vt/at′]. 2
5.3. An Illustrative Example for PerTiMo
In this section we illustrate the RL model we have developed for PerTiMo by using Elan to simulate and
analyse a simple network system with access permissions. Recall the simple PerTiMo specification CheckAP
introduced at the beginning of Section 5. Then we can apply the approach described in Section 5.2 to map
CheckAP into an RL model RL(CheckAP). To illustrate RL(CheckAP) and help clarify the definition of the
[callsP ] rewrite rules, consider the following two rewrite rules that capture the (Calls) action rule for the
two process definitions in CheckAP :
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[callsP ] al[(req : aps) | pp]⇒
al[S(go(1,Check) then in(a, 1)(SL) then go(1, SL) then stop else stop : aps) | pp]
[callsP ] al[(chk : aps) | pp]⇒ al[S(out(a, 2) < Area > then chk else chk : aps) | pp]
We can now use the support tool Elan to execute RL(CheckAP) and to investigate the behaviour of
various network systems based on the definitions in CheckAP . As an example, consider the following network:
Safe [[ req :  ]] | Check [[ chk : {put〈a@Check〉} ]]
After translating this into RL(CheckAP) we can use Elan to derive the following rewrite trace which shows
how a process from location Safe is able to gain appropriate access permission to reach a secure location Area.
Safe[(req : )] | Check [(chk : AP (put , a,Check))]
=⇒
Safe[(go(1,Check) then in(a, 1)(SL) then go(1, SL) then stop else stop : )] |
Check [(chk : AP (put , a,Check))]
=⇒
Safe[(go(1,Check) then in(a, 1)(SL) then go(1, SL) then stop else stop : )] |
Check [(out(a, 2) < Area > then chk else chk : AP (put , a,Check))]
=⇒
Check [(out(a, 2) < Area > then chk else chk : AP (put , a,Check)) |
(in(a, 1)(SL) then go(1, SL) then stop else stop : AP (get , a,Check))]
=⇒
Check [(chk : AP (put , a,Check)) | (go(1,Area) then stop : AP (get , a,Check))]
=⇒
Check [(out(a, 2) < Area > then chk else chk : AP (put , a,Check))] | Area[(stop : )]
The trace contains five derivation steps and this can be shown to be the minimum needed in order to
allow a process req to migrate from location Safe to the secure location Area.
Next we consider whether a process starting from another initial location (represented by Other here)
can gain access to Area using the following network:
Other [[ req : {get〈a@Check〉} ]] | Check [[ chk : {put〈a@Check〉} ]]
By applying a simple search strategy using Elan to the translated network term we are able to confirm that
it is not possible for the process starting from Other to reach Area even when initially given the required
access permission. These results are in-line with those derived using the judgement rules in Section 5.1.
6. Conclusions
TiMo [CiK08] is an appealing process algebra proposed for prototyping software engineering applications
where time and mobility are combined. PerTiMo [CiK11b, CiK14] extended TiMo with interprocess com-
munication controlled by access permissions that processes must possess in order to send and receive in-
formation. Moreover, processes can acquire new access permissions, or lose some of their current access
permissions while moving between locations, modelling an important security feature. Crucially, it is pos-
sible to verify that a migrating process possesses a sufficiently rich set of initial access permissions so that
whenever it attempts to communicate over a channel at a certain location, it has the required access per-
mission, irrespective of the other processes used in the overall system. Both TiMo and PerTiMo use
local clocks and local maximal concurrency of actions, and such choice of semantics is motivated by the
assumptions made by the GALS approach [Das06], which specifies that systems operate under a `globally
asynchronous/locally synchronous' execution strategy. Related models can be found in the literature, such
as the timed pi-calculus [Ber04], timed distributed pi-calculus [CiP06], and timed mobile ambients [AmC07].
The distributed pi-calculus also incorporates an explicit notion of location, and dealing with static resources
access [Hen07] by using a type system. Several systems encompass various forms of access control policies
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in distributed systems. Other related work on access control in distributed systems has been done in the
context of the language Klaim and its extensions [Bet03, Bet05]. Another example is [BuG07] which uses
cryptographic operations and capability types to obtain a secure implementation of a typed pi-calculus.
Rewriting Logic (RL) [Mes92] provides a wellsupported logical framework for modelling concurrent
systems and has been used to model a range of process algebra languages. In [MaM96, MaM02] a model of
CCS is developed using RL, though this model is not fully executable by tools such as Maude [CDEL02].
This work is extended in [VeM05] by using the reflective properties of Maude to develop a fully executable
model of CCS. This interesting paper also provides a comprehensive model for the the LOTOS [Lot89]
specification language. A high-level discussion of the use of Elan for prototyping pi-calculus specifications
is provided in [Vir96] but while the use of strategies is mentioned no specific details are provided. The RL
model of TiMo presented here appears to be novel in its use of strategies to cope with maximal parallel
computational steps.
In this paper we used RL to develop a model and implementation of both TiMo and PerTiMo. The
RL model was based on developing a strategy which can capture a maximal parallel computational step of a
TiMo specification, including its time rule based previously on negative premises. We have then provided an
operational semantics for PerTiMo by modifying our RL semantics of TiMo, and investigated the safety
of communication and migration in terms of access permissions. This illustrates the significant flexibility
and extendibility provided by using the RL framework with strategies. We have also formally shown the
correctness of the resulting semantics by proving it is both sound and complete. We illustrated how the
Elan tool and, in particular, its user defined strategies can be used to model and analyse TiMo and
PerTiMo specifications. While the examples used are intentionally simple for brevity, they still provides an
interesting first insight into the range of properties that can be investigated.
The development of analytical and verification techniques continues to be our main concern at the present
moment  especially in order to deal with static timing analysis  initial results in this direction have been
reported in [CKS12]. Developing efficient support tools for PerTiMo is part of the work, and we see this
paper as key step forward.
In future work we intend to investigate extending our approach to handle other security related aspects of
software engineering designs, such as allowing access permissions (at particular locations) to control process
migration, adding security levels for migrating processes, allowing messages to contain access permissions,
and analysing security policies for access and migration control. Interestingly, the RL model allows a range
of semantic choices for PerTiMo to be considered by changing the derivation step strategy (e.g. adding
priorities or fairness assumptions) and we are currently investigating these different semantic choices. We
also intend to perform a variety of verification case studies to illustrate the practical application of our
methods and investigate its limitations. Finally, we note that at present the analysis of TiMo and PerTiMo
specifications is limited by the search capabilities and efficiency of Elan. Work is now underway to develop
Maude [CDEL02] implementations of the RL model presented here with the aim of improving both the
range and efficiency of model analysis.
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